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Abstract
We introduce CheckNet, a method for secure inference with deep neural networks
on untrusted devices. CheckNet is like a checksum for neural network inference: it
verifies the integrity of the inference computation performed by untrusted devices
to 1) ensure the inference has actually been performed, and 2) ensure the inference
has not been manipulated by an attacker. CheckNet is completely transparent to
the third party running the computation, applicable to all types of neural networks,
does not require specialized hardware, adds little overhead, and has negligible
impact on model performance. CheckNet can be configured to provide different
levels of security depending on application needs and compute/communication
budgets. We present both empirical and theoretical validation of CheckNet on
multiple popular deep neural network models, showing excellent attack detection
(0.88-0.99 AUC) and attack success bounds.
1 Introduction
Leveraging untrusted third party devices and resources to execute deep learning inference serves an
important role, but poses serious security risks. Untrusted third parties can purposely manipulate
inference outputs in order to attack the machine learning application, for example, by changing the
result of a classification problem. Alternatively, third parties can be “lazy” and return random or
previously computed outputs in order to avoid expending computational resources performing the
actual inference calculation.
In order to allow for trusted inference computation on untrusted third party devices, there is a need to
verify the integrity of the inference computation. Limited efforts to date in this field have restricted
applicability or required specialized hardware. New methods are needed that are generally applicable
to commonly used and deployed deep learning models.
To this end we introduce CheckNet, a general method for verifying the integrity of deep learning
inference computations performed by an untrusted third party. Just as a checksum verifies the integrity
of data, CheckNet verifies the integrity of a machine learning inference computation. Specifically, it
verifies that a given inference computation has been correctly executed and that the results have not
been manipulated. CheckNet allows for configurable security levels based on application needs while
being applicable to a wide range of deep neural network models.
In order to be widely applicable and easily used, CheckNet is designed to be compatible with all
common deep learning methods and not require any specialized hardware. Specifically, CheckNet
has the following design goals: 1) fast to verify the integrity of the computation and output; 2)
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requires only minimal change and retraining (last layer only) of the original network; and 3) adds
only minimal communication and computation overhead.
CheckNet verifies inference integrity with two techniques. The first, HashCheck, verifies that the
inference computation is consistent with respect to the input. The second, CrossCheck, verifies that
the inference output has not been manipulated. Together, these techniques are able to protect against
attacks such as replay attacks (adversary returns an old but valid inference result), random attacks
(adversary returns random results in order to avoid actually performing the inference computation),
and targeted manipulation attacks (adversary changes the values of particular output nodes in order to
change the resulting classification). Further, CheckNet is completely transparent to the third party.
While the classification task is used in this paper, CheckNet is applicable to other deep learning tasks,
as it acts on node values of the penultimate layer (e.g., prior to the softmax layer), therefore not tying
it to a specific task.
We present empirical and theoretical validation of CheckNet on multiple popular deep neural network
models under a wide set of attacks, showing excellent attack detection capabilities, and prove bounds
on the probability of inference attacks evading CheckNet detection.
2 CheckNet
CheckNet is a general method to verify the integrity of an inference computation. Given an original
network computation y = t(x) for network t, CheckNet verifies for a given input x that the inference
computation t(x) has actually been executed on x, and that the output y has not been manipulated.
To do this, CheckNet uses two techniques: HashCheck and CrossCheck. HashCheck ensures the
inference computation has actually been executed on x. It does this by constructing a pair of hash
functions (f, g) such that the bithash hx = f(x) of inference input x is approximately equal to
the bithash hy = g(y) of inference output y, or hx ≈ hy. CrossCheck ensures the output has not
been manipulated (e.g., by swapping output node values to change the classification result). It does
this by obscuring the result of the model by outputting multiple intertwined sets of results, building
in redundancy, and cross checking the results among themselves. Figure 1 shows an overview of
CheckNet and its two techniques.
2.1 HashCheck
HashCheck ensures that the output returned from an inference calculation is consistent with respect
to the input. This helps protects against attacks in which, for either adversarial or lazy reasons, third
parties purposely return an output that is unrelated to the input. Examples include returning either an
old but valid inference result, or randomly generated inference result, instead of the true inference
result. An overview of HashCheck is shown at the top of Figure 1.
HashCheck provides a fast integrity check between the input and output by constructing a pair of
hash functions (f, g) relating the input x and the inference output y to a common bithash value.
Specifically, hash functions are built such that the bithash hx = f(x) of inference input x is
approximately equal (within a threshold) to the bithash hy = g(y) of inference output y, or hx ≈ hy .
Further, the hash functions are built to have negligible computation cost compared with the network
inference itself. In this paper, we use an MLP with one hidden layer whose output is a binary code
as the hash functions. For the results in this paper with AlexNet [7] on the 10-class classification
problem, verification with HashCheck uses only approximately 1% of the MACs used for inference
and only 2.9kB of additional communication.
The HashCheck training process involves no modifications to the underlying model and uses a dataset
created by pairing the inputs X = {x}Ni=1 with the output Y = {y}Ni=1 of the model, where N is the
size of the dataset. The two hash networks are derived in the following process: first, the g network
is initialized as a random matrix followed by a binary quantization, therefore performing a random
linear projection from y. This network remains fixed throughout the entire training process and serves
as a source of randomness. Second, the f network is initialized as a single layer MLP followed by
a sigmoid function, and is trained to map the input x to the bithash of the corresponding inference
output y. f is trained via backpropagation with loss term L(hx,hy), where L is binary cross entropy
loss, and hy is the output of g(y) with binary quantization applied. Both hashes are of length l.
Through this process, f learns to map the input x to the bithash code derived from the random
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projection of the output y, as determined by g. Since random projections preserve distances [1],
HashCheck learns the hash function f mapping x into a bithash space where the distances between
the outputs of the network (y = t(x)) are preserved. Any deviation from the true y will result in a
mismatch between the bithash codes. In order to increase robustness, multiple sets of (f, g) functions
are learned and used together. Section 2.3 describes how HashCheck detects attacks.
2.2 CrossCheck
CrossCheck ensures the true output of an inference calculation has not been manipulated or fabricated
in any way that changes the prediction outcome. It does this by obscuring the original output through
returning multiple redundant, shuffled sets of results, and then cross checking the results among
themselves, which delivers additional robustness as well. An overview of CrossCheck is shown at the
bottom of Figure 1.
To use CrossCheck, only the final layer of a model is modified and retrained to use CrossCheck.
The process has three steps. First, the output layer is expanded to have additional output nodes. For
a model performing Nc-class classification, the output layer is expanded to have No output nodes,
where No  Nc (shown as the “Expanded Output Layer” in Figure 1, where the output layer of
the model for a 3-class classification problem is expanded to have 20  3 nodes). Second, Ns
CrossCheck sets are formed, where each CrossCheck set (shown as the green, blue, orange and
red sets of nodes in Figure 1) consists of Nc nodes chosen at random from the No output nodes in
the augmented model. CrossCheck sets may overlap (i.e., the same output node may be used in
different CrossCheck sets, and may correspond to different labels in the different CrossCheck sets),
and some nodes do not need to be in any CrossCheck sets at all, serving as decoys. Only the model
owner knows the CrossCheck sets. The third party has no knowledge of how many sets are used
or membership of these sets. Third, only the last layer of the model is retrained on the training set
such that each CrossCheck set correctly performs the Nc-class classification task using its own nodes.
As a result of training the modified model in this way, each CrossCheck set should independently
output the correct classification, and therefore can be used to “cross check” each other, as discussed
in Section 2.3. Changing the model in this way has no/negligible impact on accuracy.
This CrossCheck mechanism provides security by making it difficult for an adversary to manipulate
the output from the model. For example, in a model without CrossCheck, if an adversary wished to
change the model output, it could swap the maximum value in the output with another node, resulting
in a different classification result. Under CrossCheck however, this attack would be difficult to execute
because the adversary does not know which nodes to attack (because of obfuscation), how many
nodes need to be attacked (because the level of redundancy is unknown), and the fact that mistakes
are likely to be detected. Even in cases where the adversary learned information about the sets, efforts
to exploit this information will still be detected by CheckNet, as shown in Section 3.
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Figure 1: CheckNet verifies the integrity of inference computations using two methods: HashCheck
(ensures result y is consistent with input x) and CrossCheck (ensures result has not been manipulated).
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2.3 CheckNet Attack Detection Mechanism
Figure 1 shows how CheckNet uses the HashCheck and CrossCheck techniques. Specifically, to
use CheckNet to protect a model against attacks, the original model is modified to include the
CrossCheck output layer, and a set of Nh HashCheck hash functions {(fi, gi)}Nhi=1 are learned. The
CheckNet-protected model is then given to the untrusted third party, which uses the model in normal
fashion. The use of CheckNet is completely transparent to the third party. As far as the third party is
concerned, the model is a normal model with an No-dimensional output. Specifically, the third party
does not know the hash functions, the true underlying number of classes Nc in the original model,
the number of CrossCheck sets Ns, or the membership of each of the Ns CrossCheck sets. The third
party runs the inference normally, resulting in a No-dimensional output.
This No-dimensional output is then returned. First, an “unverified result” is obtained by collecting
the classification vote of each CrossCheck set (i.e., applying a softmax to each CrossCheck set and
selecting the class corresponding to the maximum) and using a majority vote. Second, the integrity
of the result is verified using both HashCheck and CrossCheck. For the HashCheck verification, for
each pair of hash functions (fi, gi), the bithash of the original input hx = fi(x) and the bithash of
the returned output hy = gi(y) are obtained, and the bitwise distance between the two bithash values
‖hx − hy‖0 is compared to a threshold Th. If ‖hx − hy‖0 ≤ Th for some threshold Th, the result
passes that particular HashCheck integrity check. For the CrossCheck verification, cardinality of
the majority vote m is compared with a threshold Tc. If m ≥ Tc, the result passes the CrossCheck
integrity check. If the result passes all of the HashCheck and CrossCheck integrity checks, the result
is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected.
Both techniques are needed to detect the wide range of possible attacks, which include “hard
working/adversarial” attacks, which seek to subvert the system by changing the prediction outcome,
and “lazy” attacks, which seek to avoid actually executing the inference computation (see Section 3.1
for examples of these attacks). HashCheck alone cannot detect small changes in the output nodes, as
certain margins of changes to the output are needed to change the resulting bithash (as neural networks
are robust to these small changes). CrossCheck provides the mechanism to thwart a “hard-working”
adversary who may otherwise try to find tiny surfaces on the manifold that they can alter in order
to subvert the system. Further, CrossCheck alone does not protect against attacks that return valid
outputs that do not match the input, as its job is to detect if an output is valid or not, and so relies on
HashCheck to detect the discrepancy with the input.
The computational and communication complexity of CheckNet are both small compared to that of
the original model. The computational complexity of HashCheck is O(NhlNo), where Nh is the
number of HashCheck networks, l is bithash length, and No is the number of output nodes. The
computational complexity of the protected model’s new last layer after being expanded by CrossCheck
is O(Nop), where p is the number of output nodes in the model’s penultimate layer, as compared to
the O(Ncp) complexity of the unprotected model’s last layer. Further, the communication complexity
of CheckNet communication isO(No), whereNo is the number of output nodes, while the complexity
of the unprotected model is O(Nc). These hyperparameters can be adjusted to meet compute and
communication budgets, as is further discussed in Section 3.
3 Evaluations
We present empirical results for CheckNet under different attack models. We evaluate on multiple
popular models, MobileNet [5] and AlexNet [7], and evaluate performance using the CIFAR-10
dataset [6]. As MobileNet is a network specifically designed for mobile devices likely to run inference
calculations for peers, these results are particularly salient. For all results, we use standard CIFAR-10
train/test splits (60k/10k samples, respectively). We also get results on the FashionMNIST [11] and
CIFAR-100 [6] datasets, but observe similar trends and therefore omit them for space purposes. We
train the models and generate results using a GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU.
3.1 Attacks Models
We evaluate the effectiveness of CheckNet under three attack models on an inference computation
t(x) computed on input x that should return y:
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1. Random: a random inference result is returned, where the value of each output node is
sampled from a distribution characterizing valid output node values. This attack would be
used by a “lazy” third party not wanting to actually run the inference computation.
2. Targeted Classification Change: the value of n output nodes within output vector y are
changed to above the maximum value max(y) in an attempt to change the classification
result. This attack would be used by an “adversarial” third party to change the result. Since
this requires them to first run the original inference in order to obtain the result and then try
to alter it, this attack requires effort, making it a “hard-working” third party attack.
3. Replay: a different but otherwise valid inference result y′ computed on a different x′
is returned. This attack would also be used by a “lazy” third party. Additionally, if an
“adversarial” third party was somehow able to learn about the number or membership of
CrossCheck sets, their targeted classification attack would resemble a replay attack, as they
would be able to closely approximate the output distribution of another class.
3.2 Attack Detection and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curves
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for CheckNet’s detection ability for the three
attack methods are shown in Figure 2 for MobileNet and Figure 3 for AlexNet. The curves are
plotted in terms of true positive rate (TPR: rate at which attacks are successfully detected) and false
positive rate (FPR: rate at which legitimate inputs are incorrectly detected as attacks). The results are
shown for the following hyperparameter settings: 100 output nodes (No), 30 CrossCheck sets (Ns),
64-bit bithash length (l). The ROC curves are generated by varying the CrossCheck and HashCheck
thresholds resulting in different TPR/FPR tradeoffs that make up each ROC curve. Both thresholds
are set by selecting seven threshold values evenly spaced between the minimum and maximum
threshold values (CrossCheck threshold Tc ranges from 0 to the number of CrossCheck sets Ns, and
HashCheck threshold Th ranges from 0 to the bithash length l), resulting in 49 pairs of thresholds
evaluated. A sample is accepted only if all threshold conditions are met, and is rejected otherwise.
Threshold settings that result in a strictly worse TPR/FPR trade-off are discarded.
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Figure 2: ROC curves for attack on MobileNet.
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Figure 3: ROC curves for attacks on AlexNet.
CheckNet provides accurate attack detection of all three attack methods, achieving AUC scores on
the random, targeted, and replay attacks of 0.98, 0.95, and 0.88 with the MobileNet model, and 0.99,
0.97, and 0.87, with the AlexNet model. The replay attack is the most difficult attack of the three to
detect because the output is an otherwise valid inference output, just not for the given input sample.
As a result, the CrossCheck technique is not applicable in this case (as its job is only to verify that the
output is valid, which by definition a replayed output is), so only the HashCheck technique can detect
the replay attack.
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3.3 Effects of Hyperparameters on Attack Detection
Figure 4 shows the effects of different hyperparameter settings for the CheckNet under a targeted
attack: number of output nodes (No), number of CrossCheck sets (Nc), and bithash length (l).
Generally, the robustness of CheckNet can be controlled by increasing 1) the number of output nodes
(No) and 2) the bithash length (l). Increasing the bithash length (l) improves attack detection (red vs
blue curve), aligning with the theoretical findings in Section 4. Using a smaller number of CrossCheck
sets improves performance (black vs blue curve), as having a larger number of CrossCheck sets
increases the number of nodes that are used in potentially conflicting ways by different CrossCheck
sets (as it increases the overlap between different CrossCheck sets). This loss in detection accuracy
may be acceptable in order to gain the obfuscation benefits, as having more overlap between different
CrossCheck sets makes it more difficult for an adversary to glean information regarding CrossCheck
set membership. Increasing the number of output nodes improves attack detection (black vs yellow
curve), which is also also explained by the fact that there is less overlapping when more output nodes
are used for the same number of CrossCheck sets.
3.4 Robustness Against Undetected Attacks
CheckNet users can choose a TPR/FPR tradeoff along the ROC curve that suits the application via
the Th and Tc hyperparameters. Choosing a setting with a TPR < 1 will by definition result in some
attacks not being detected. However, even in this case, CheckNet can still classify these “undetected
attack samples” correctly in some settings due to the redundancy in the CrossCheck mechanism.
Figure 5 shows this result for different settings of Th and Tc using “effective accuracy” (defined as the
accuracy of the CheckNet protected network on the attack samples that are not rejected) as a metric
under a targeted attack, compared with the accuracy of the original model with no attack (grey line).
For the different threshold settings, even under the targeted attack, CheckNet protected networks
reject most of the attacks (dotted green line and right-y axis), and achieve similar accuracy on the
attack samples it fails to reject. Lower values of Tc cause the CheckNet models to miss detecting
more attacks, as shown by the green line denoting percent of attacks detected, therefore lowering
the accuracy because relatively more egregious attacks that cannot be rectified via the CrossCheck
majority voting are not filtered out, while higher levels filter out these harder attacks, leaving those
that CrossCheck can still correctly classify even under attack. A similar trend is also seen with regard
to Th, where lower, more stringent thresholds lead to higher effective accuracy than that of higher,
more lenient thresholds. These results align with our theoretical analysis in Section 4, where we show
it is harder for an attacker to launch a successful attack as Tc increases or as Th decreases, resulting
in a better effective accuracy overall.
Figure 4: ROC curves under targeted
attack on AlexNet for different hyper-
parameters: output nodes (No), Cross-
Check sets (Nc), and bithash length (l).
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4 Analysis
We derive theoretical models for robustness against attacks on the two CheckNet integrity verification
mechanisms (HashCheck and CrossCheck) in order to show that it is hard to attack either of these
components. This supports the empirical results in Section 3.4 showing it is hard for an attacker to
avoid CheckNet’s detection mechanisms and successfully alter the classification results.
4.1 HashCheck Analysis
We consider the attack in which the third party tries to pass the integrity check without performing
the inference computation (such as the “random” attack described in Section 3).
Definition 1. (Successful Attack on HashCheck) A random attack is successful if an attacker can
guess a y′ that results in ‖hx − hy′‖0 ≤ Th.
Theorem 1. The probability that the adversary can subvert the bithash integrity check (successful
attack on HashCheck) is 1−F (l−Th; l, 12 ) (where F is the binomial CDF), or 1−
∑l−Th
i=0
(
l
i
)
1
2
i 1
2
l−i
.
Proof. Given a mapping g from y′ to h′y , for every bithash hy′ , there exists a corresponding y
′ that
maps to hy′ . To guess a bithash hy′ such that ‖hx−hy′‖0 ≤ Th, an attacker needs to randomly draw
l-bit hy′ with its corresponding y′ such that at least (l−Th) bits match with hx. This is characterized
by a binomial distribution with l trials, each of probability 12 , i.e., the probability of a successful
attack on HashCheck is equal to 1− F (l − Th; l, 12 ), or 1−
∑l−Th
i=0
(
l
i
)
1
2
i 1
2
l−i.
4.2 CrossCheck
We consider an attack to change the classification result from class i to class j for some j 6= i. To do
this, the adversary must maximize the intra-set value of the node corresponding to class j in at least
Tc of the Ns CrossCheck sets.
Definition 2. (Successful Attack on CrossCheck) An attack is successful if an attacker can find y′
that results in the majority vote is greater than Tc.
We define the following terminology. “Overlap” refers to situations where nodes can be in multiple
CrossCheck sets, and “No Overlap” refers to situations where nodes are exclusively in one CrossCheck
set. “Knowledge” refers to when the adversary knows which nodes are used in at least one CrossCheck
set, and “No Knowledge” refers to when the adversary does not know if a node is used in any
CrossCheck set. In actual use, the adversary has “No Knowledge,” and we only consider “Knowledge”
for the purpose of the proof. Let A be an event that an attacker succeeds.
Lemma 1. P (A|Overlap, No Knowledge) ≤ P (A|Overlap, Knowledge)
Proof. An adversary selects g nodes to maximize. There are
(
Ns
g
)
possible ways to successfully
choose g target nodes. Without knowledge, there are
(
No
g
)
possible sets of guesses to make. With
knowledge, there are
(
NsNc
g
)
possible sets of guesses to make. Because NsNc < No, knowledge
restricts the selection space, making an attack more likely to succeed with knowledge than without.
Lemma 2. P (A|Overlap, Knowledge) ≤ P (A|No Overlap, Knowledge)
Proof. Without overlap, selecting one of the target nodes to maximize (set above max(y)) has no
impact on the efficacy of a second successful selection within a different CrossCheck set, as it by
definition cannot be in the second set. With overlap, in the non-zero number of cases where the first
successfully selected node is is also a non-target in a second CrossCheck set, subsequently selecting
the target node in this other CrossCheck set to similarly maximize will result in a tie between the two
selected nodes. This tie will have to be broken between the two nodes, which in some cases will result
in the wrong node being maximized and the attack therefore being unsuccessful. Therefore, because
there are strictly more scenarios in which node selection can cause an attack to be unsuccessful in the
overlap case, the overlap case has a lower probability of being successful.
Lemma 3. P (A|No Overlap, Knowledge) = 1− F (Tc;Ns, 1Nc )
Proof. The probability of a successful attack with this knowledge is characterized by a binomial
distribution with Ns (number of CrossCheck sets) trials, where each trial has success probability 1Nc ,
where Nc is the number of nodes in each CrossCheck set. The probability that the adversary can
subvert the CrossCheck integrity check with no overlap and the full knowledge of the CrossCheck sets
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is therefore 1− F (Tc;Ns, 1Nc ) (where F (·) is the binomial CDF), or 1−
∑Tc
i=0
(
Ns
i
)
1
Nc
i Nc−1
Nc
Ns−i.
Theorem 2. The upper bound on the probability that the adversary can subvert the CrossCheck
integrity check (Successful Attack on CrossCheck) is 1− F (Tc;Ns, 1Nc ) (where F (·) is the binomial
CDF), or 1−∑Tci=0 (Nsi ) 1Nc i Nc−1Nc Ns−i.
Proof. Following Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 above, the upper bound on the probability that
the adversary can successfully subvert the CrossCheck integrity check is 1− F (Tc;Ns, 1Nc ) (where
FX(·) is the binomial CDF), or 1−
∑Tc
i=0
(
Ns
i
)
1
Nc
i Nc−1
Nc
Ns−i.
5 Related Work
CrossCheck training can be viewed as an application of dropout [9]. Each CrossCheck set is trained
by “dropping out” output nodes not in its set, and the CrossCheck output can be viewed as averaging
a set of sub-models. The voting method to obtain a classification from CrossCheck sets can be seen
as an ensemble method, which is known to provide additional robustness and accuracy [8].
Verifying inference integrity has been recently studied in limited contexts. Recently introduced
methods either frame the problem in a constrained framework (e.g., modeling the network as an
arithmetic circuit) or use specialized hardware. [4] utilizes an interactive proof to provide proof of
correctness, but is only applicable to neural networks that can be expressed as an arithmetic circuit.
This limits applicability, as it cannot use common activation functions (e.g., ReLU) except in the
last layer or common pooling layers (e.g., max pooling). In contrast, our method does not place
any restrictions on the underlying model. [2] uses a single layer at a time execution model to make
modifications to the input and each layer’s weight matrix in order to provide privacy and verify
correctness. It requires computing secure matrix transformations for each layer, sending the secure
input and weight matrix for each layer to the third party, and returning the output for each layer to the
verifier. This adds computational and communication overhead. In contrast, CheckNet outsources
the entire inference computation to the third party, adding little computational and communication
overhead. [10] introduces a framework for partitioning inference calculations between a trusted
execution environment (such as IntelTM SGX [3]) and an untrusted GPU, but requires a trusted
execution environment. In contrast, our method does not have any hardware requirements, and is
therefore applicable where specialized hardware is not available (e.g., IoT devices).
In contrast to all these methods, to our knowledge we are the first to propose a method for secure
inference that is applicable to deep learning models in general without the need for specialized
hardware. As such, our proposed CheckNet method will be applicable to all devices capable of
running inference computations, without adding model architecture or hardware constraints.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced CheckNet, a general method for verifying the integrity of inference computations
performed by an untrusted third party. CheckNet verifies that the inference computation has actually
been performed and has not been manipulated by an adversary. CheckNet will enable the expansion
and scaling of inference computations to untrusted third party devices and cloud providers in a secure
manner. As machine learning is applied to increasingly critical industries such as healthcare and
national safety, securing inference with methods such as CheckNet will become a critical component
of all machine learning applications that rely on third parties.
The main advantages of using CheckNet for secure inference are its wide applicability, small
overhead, and complete lack of prerequisites such as specialized hardware. CheckNet is generally
applicable to deep learning models (e.g., there are no theoretical limitations on model size or
architecture), and requires negligible modification to the model being protected. CheckNet adds
negligible computational overhead to the inference computation, and the verification computational
overhead is very small compared to the original network size. CheckNet also adds only negligible
communication overhead, making it well suited to network-limited applications. These overheads
can be changed via easily selected hyperparameters, which also allow users flexibility in choosing an
appropriate level of security (via a TPR/FPR tradeoff) based on application needs.
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CheckNet provides these security benefits through two mechanisms. HashCheck ensures that the
inference output is consistent with the input. CrossCheck ensures that the inference output has not
been manipulated, doing so by obscuring the output and building in redundancy that allows the
integrity of the result to be confirmed. These mechanisms work together to thwart both “lazy” attacks
that seek to avoid doing the computation and “hard-working” adversarial attacks that seek to change
the outcome, both of which we have shown CheckNet can detect with high accuracy.
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